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Abstract: The desire for genetically related children is driving an exponential rise in 
assisted reproductive service provision worldwide, including the global south. In India, 
the number of ART clinics has more than doubled over the past three years. This 
expansion has been accompanied by a similarly explosive growth in populist narratives 
that assert that one of the services offered by such clinics, commercial gestational 
surrogacy (CGS) is a form of labour that is so exceptional(ly) exploitative it should be 
banned. Provocative headlines proclaiming that surrogates are ‘Renting their wombs’ 
(Sinha, 2011) and ‘Pimping their pregnancies’ (Bindel, 2016), fuel such assertions 
suggesting that surrogates become reduced to mere wombs, vessels for carrying the 
offspring of entitled and wealthy foreigners. Although superficially compelling, such 
arguments fail to withstand detailed interrogation. Utilising insights from anthropology, 
the history of science and law and bringing to bear the findings of extended fieldwork in 
Mumbai, Jaipur and Delhi I critically analyse three assertions made in relation to 
surrogacy: that it is (a) a particularly intimate or invasive form of bodily exploitation; (b) 
a uniquely sacralized form of affective labour and (c), a uniquely generative form of 
labour. In arguing against exceptionalism I contend that such practices cannot be 
adjudged through application of universal ethical principles and norms, but rather must 
take account of the complexity of the lived experience of all the participants, placed in 
their sociological and geographical contexts.   
Keywords: Assisted Reproduction, surrogacy, clinical labour, exploitation, surrogate 
mother, India.  
Introduction  
A distinct advantage of approaching research on new human reproductive technologies via the 
history of animal and plant modification is the ability it affords to recognise that for every 
apparently ‘unprecedented’ development in the engineering of biological life there is, if not a 
precedent, then at least a significant precursor. This is certainly true of the practice of assisted 
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reproduction. Popularly imagined to have begun with the birth of Louise Brown, the world’s 
first ‘test tube’ baby in 1978, artificial insemination had, in fact, first been perfected by the 
Italian natural philosopher Lazarro Spallanzani nearly 200 years earlier in 1779.  Unconvinced 
by theories that life was generated through preformation or the action of a ‘vegetative force’ 
(something akin to the Aristotelian notion of an ‘aura seminalis) Spallanzani set about tracing 
the role of what he described as ‘spermatic worms’, this ‘race of little animals’, to the end. 
Designing ingenious methods to collect the seminal fluid of excited frogs (including clothing 
many dozens of them in waxed taffeta britches) he established, not only, that the ‘liquor’ was 
essential to conception but that he could himself intervene in this process, serving as the very 
instrument of the intermingling. This practice of ‘artificial fecundation’ as he called it, 
succeeded, miraculously, “as well as if the male himself had performed his proper function” 
(Pinto-Correia, 1997, p.197).  
Allied techniques including the freezing of bodily fluids and tissue had begun even 
earlier with Francis Bacon’s first attempts to preserve chickens by stuffing them with snow, 
experiments that unfortunately precipitated his untimely death from pneumonia. His 
contemporary Robert Boyle’s further investigations into the effects of super-cooling on 
organisms were advanced significantly in the late 19th century with the liquefaction of the 
permanent gasses. Their application in the realm of human reproduction culminated in the mid-
1950s in the successful freezing and thawing of vitrified human eggs and sperm and the 
establishment of the discipline of gamete cryobiology. Situating contemporary developments 
in assisted reproduction within this long durée of technological change is important for at least 
two reasons: it makes it possible to establish when significant ontological or epistemological 
ruptures between past and present practices occur; and to determine how, if, and in what ways, 
they act to alter our understanding of, or relations to, the social world. In short, it enables us to 
ascertain when things become genuinely ‘exceptional’.  
On this reading, it is possible to conclude that these technological developments did 
institute a genuinely unprecedented moment in the history of science. Until this time, the 
longest any gametes had retained their generative capacity outside of the body was some frozen 
rabbit semen that had, in 1926, survived for twelve hours on the overnight train from 
Cambridge to Edinburgh. The introduction of advanced cryogenic technologies were, however, 
set to radically transform the existing dynamics and organisation of cellular life. With their 
introduction, it became possible for tissues, including gametes, to be extracted and 
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disassociated from the bodies in which they were produced and to be stored for more than 100 
years without any loss of vitality.  
The spatial and temporal parameters of their ‘natural’ existence were thus able to be 
extended in ways that surpassed any previous imagining. This was significant as gametes 
became for the first time, capable of entering a state of immortalisation and hypermobility: able 
to be kept in a viable state of suspended animation; and capable of being circulated firstly, into 
the artificial body of the gamete bank, then on to laboratories where they could be fertilised to 
create embryos, before being distributed to their waiting recipients. These could include the 
women from whom they were originally sourced (following a temporal lag), but also others 
located across the globe, from California to Cambodia, who had agreed to have such embryos 
implanted in them and to carry them to term, either altruistically or for payment.  
As Marilyn Strathern (1992, 2011), Sarah Franklin (1995, 2013) and Charis Thompson 
(2005) have argued, assisted reproductive techniques disrupt conventional ideologies that have 
historically essentialised and valorised the genetic connection between mother and child. 
Motherhood undergoes a necessary reconceptualization as it is disaggregated into its new 
registers: genetic, birth, adoptive and surrogate. These ‘multiple maternities’ as Inhorn and 
Birenbaum-Carmeli (2008) call them, split apart, both socially and practically, the previously 
unified work of maternal labour, ushering in what Strathern (1992, p.27) describes as “a new 
convention: the distinction between social and biological parenting”. Add to this the concept 
that some women could be paid to carry another’s child, allowing maternal labour (conceived 
of by many as the most sacred of acts) to become commodified and we have, it would seem, 
all the conditions necessary to spark a storm of social condemnation. The backlash against 
commercial surrogacy, particularly that provided by women in developing countries has been 
both intense and sustained, amplified considerably in recent years by a deluge of press that 
characterises the provision of such services as highly exploitative. Provocative headlines 
proclaiming that surrogates are ‘Renting their wombs’ (Sinha, 2011) and ‘Pimping their 
pregnancies’ (Bindel, 2016) generate a compelling and increasingly familiar narrative: that 
such women are being coerced or deceived into a trade in which they are reduced to mere 
wombs, vessels for carrying the offspring of entitled and wealthy foreigners.  
The alarmist tenor of such accounts has also travelled, circulating beyond the 
blogosphere to inflect the discourse of those operating at even the highest levels of government 
and the judiciary today. In October 2015 two justices of the Indian Supreme Court, Justices 
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Ranjan Gogoi and N. V. Ramana called for a total ban on the provision of commercial 
surrogacy to all foreign nationals, pronouncing that “renting a womb … amounts to the 
economic and psychological exploitation of the surrogate mother and is inconsistent with the 
dignity of womanhood.”1 To near universal astonishment, and despite the fact that a revised 
Bill regulating Assisted Reproduction was then in its final stages of negotiation, the Indian 
government agreed to introduce just such a ban. What began as legal opinion has since been 
formalised into The Surrogacy (Regulation) Bill 2016, an Act that criminalises all forms of 
commercial surrogacy even those commissioned by Indian nationals. That surrogacy as an 
activity was sectioned out of India’s wider Assisted Reproductive Technology (Regulation) Bill 
of 2016 would appear to sustain the implicit assertion that commercial surrogacy constitutes a 
uniquely exploitative form of labour that demands singular attention and bespoke forms of 
regulatory address.  
My intention in this paper is to take this powerful assertion and to scrutinize it 
forensically. I do so, not because I think that commercial surrogacy cannot be exploitative, but 
rather because I am unconvinced by arguments that it is inherently or necessarily so.2 Appeals 
to exceptionality must, if they are to be sustained, survive crisp theoretical and empirical 
analysis. Drawing on four years of intensive empirical work within India’s burgeoning ART 
sector3 I consider how, and in what ways, assertions about the fundamental immorality of 
commercial gestational surrogacy (that emanate primarily from Western philosophical 
traditions) sustain when translated into practice in divergent localities and sociological 
contexts. The contention that commercial surrogacy is an exceptionally exploitative form of 
labour appears to rest on two sets of arguments. The first is that there is something distinct 
about reproductive labour itself that justifies its exclusion from the realm of commodification, 
that it to say, that makes its commercialisation abhorrent; the second, that it is something about 
the social or spatial organisation of that labour that makes it exceptionally exploitative and 
                                                          
1 As reported in The Times of India 15 October 2015. Available at: 
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/SC-suggests-ban-on-commercial-surrogacy/articleshow/49365734.cms  
2 In this respect I concur with arguments offered in Wilkinson (2016) although this work predates that 
publication.  
3 This research was undertaking under Wellcome Trust grant (097733/B/11/Z): Investigating Reproductive Ethics-
in-Context: The Indian Experience. 123 interviews with a range of key stakeholders including clinicians, hospital 
executives, private fertility centre managers; egg and sperm donors, surrogates, agents, commissioning parents, 
IVF consumers, pharmaceutical company representatives, policy makers, and NGO advocates were completed 
between 2013 and 2017 in Jaipur, Mumbai, Delhi, and Bangalore. Full ethical approval was obtained from King’s 
College London (SSHL/12/13-26) and participating hospitals in India.   
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thus, requisite of specific legislation. It is my intention to subject both claims to detailed 
interrogation here.  
 
Why fetishize reproductive labour as exceptional?  
A range of recent literature has carefully explicated the ways in which the generative capacities 
of ‘life itself’ to employ Nikolas Rose’s term (Rose, 2009) have recently been drawn into 
regimes of commodification. ‘Life itself’ here includes not only alienated tissues, organs, 
reproductive cells and DNA, but also forms of embodied labour that have become key 
generators of value in the bioeconomy. Sociologists Melinda Cooper and Catherine Waldby 
argue that the in vivo biology of human subjects, that is to say an individual’s very corporeality 
and its capacity to endure, to sustain, or to generate life, is becoming an increasingly valuable 
resource to the life sciences industries. As they astutely note, these industries have come to rely 
“on an extensive, yet unacknowledged labour force, whose service consists in the visceral 
experience of experimental drug consumption … ejaculation, tissue extraction and gestation”, 
forms of work that they go on to characterise as ‘clinical labour’ (Cooper & Waldby, 2104, p. 
7).  
They argue, following Boltanski and Chiapello (2005), that post–Fordist models of economic 
organisation and governance have invoked profound shifts in the organisation of labour. We 
have moved, in the West at least, from an economy that provided near full employment and 
strong forms of statutory labour protection for industrial workers to a system that favours 
outsourcing to private contractors. This, in turn results in more precarious conditions of work 
and greater exposure to occupational health and safety risks. Clinical labourers, they suggest, 
are particularly vulnerable: exploited financially, in unstable outsourced employment, working 
under oppressive contractual relationships, they have become the ‘contingent workers of the 
bioeconomy’, the victims of a ‘voracious neo-liberalism’. Gendered and racialized divisions of 
labour are said to further amplify these inequities (Thompson & Sofio, 2014).  Oppressed 
minorities and women of colour who cling on to life at the margins of human existence are 
argued to be especially susceptible to exploitation with women’s reproductive capacities 
becoming the target of a wider marketization of biological vitality. Earlier sociological studies 
(Macklin, 1988; Van Niekerk & Van Zyl, 1995; Baylis & McLoud, 2007; Nelson, 2013; Kirby, 
2014) have characterised both gestational surrogacy and egg vending as malign practices in 
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which women can be pressured to provide contractual use of their bodily capacities to others 
for payment in ways that compromise both their autonomy and their dignity.  
Whilst such analyses are extremely useful they do raise the question of why these 
particular forms of reproductive labour should be fetishized as exceptional (and thus prohibited 
from commercialisation) or how indeed they differ from earlier historical modes of contractual 
bodily exploitation. The argument seems to rest on three popular assertions: that reproductive 
labour is (a) a particularly intimate or invasive form of bodily exploitation; (b) a uniquely 
sacralized form of affective labour or; (c), a uniquely generative form of labour. These factors 
together, it is argued, serve to set reproductive labour apart from the other forms of labour in 
which we routinely engage, and for which we are unproblematically recompensed. It is to an 
unpacking of these core assumptions that I first wish to turn.   
It is certainly true that carrying a child for another is a particularly intimate form of bodily 
labour, but is it any more so than some of its historical antecedents? At all stages of human 
development and in all economic systems from the feudal to agrarian, industrial to post-
industrial the unique corporealities of particular individuals, from the hulking strength of the 
stone mason to the wiry resilience of the rickshaw pullers, have been exploited for profit often 
under precarious forms of contract labour. Historically, the argument that ‘bodies themselves’ 
are unimportant in wage labour exchange as individuals are, in effect, selling their abstracted, 
alienable labour rather than their embodied selves has, as O’Connell Davidson (2014, p.516) 
astutely notes, (citing Davidoff) only served “to reproduce ‘the fiction of disembodied actors 
with the capacity to sell labour away from the person (the body) of the labourer’”. In fact, 
sacrificing the fabric of one’s very being in the service of paid employment, whatever that 
employment might be, should, in my view, always be understood as an intensely intimate form 
of bodily labour. It remains a curiosity that the term ‘bodily labour’ seems reserved solely for 
acts that involve paid use of bodily parts designed for procreation or reproduction.  
Abolitionists routinely conflate gestational surrogacy with prostitution (which they 
confusingly argue is also a unique form of self-commodification) in their attempt to draw 
parallels between what they consider to be two equally pernicious expressions of female 
subjugation under conditions of patriarchal domination. In so doing they extol the narrative 
that while labour power is generally understood in the liberal tradition as a form of property 
that is separable from the person and thus able to be justly alienated for sale to the highest 
bidder; sale or rent of one’s intimate sexualised self cannot be similarly or unproblematically 
7 
 
abstracted away from the essence of the seller’s personhood and must consequently remain 
outwith the realm of commodification. What such conceptions obscure, however, are the very 
many commonalities that such labour shares with other allied forms of reproductive, affective 
and emotional labour. These, I suggest, work to collapse, rather than sustain, arguments for 
exceptionality.  
Let us take by way of example, two other forms of highly intimate bodily labour that 
have long histories of commodification. As Sussman and others have noted (1982, p.3) wet 
nursing, “the practice of sending newborn children away to be suckled by rural women for 
pay”, was commonplace in Europe from the middle ages onwards; whilst the practice of 
donating sperm, although initially unrecompensed has subsequently become a recognised form 
of waged labour for men across the globe. Both are clearly intimate forms of bodily labour that 
have been unproblematically commodified. The exceptionality of gestational surrogacy must 
therefore rest on some other quality of the expended labour. It is at this point that three further 
arguments are brought into play: that carrying a child is a uniquely invasive form of bodily 
labour; that it is a sacralised labour unlike any other, and that it is, in some way, uniquely 
generative.   
It has been argued that whilst wet nursing or sperm donation are practices that involve 
bodily intimacy, this labour is neither invasive nor risky. The resources that are commodified 
(breast milk and semen) are naturally renewable and contributing them is, it is suggested, 
undemanding, if not even potentially pleasurable. While some countervailing evidence 
suggests that managing either as a form of paid employment is by no means as effortless as 
may be first presumed (Almeling, 2011) they do not typically involve the internalisation of 
risk. Surrogacy and egg vending, conversely involve the ingestion of drugs such as ovarian 
hyperstimulants that can induce pain, abdominal inflammation, possible renal failure and even, 
in 5 per cent of cases, the onset of ovarian hyperstimulation that can result in premature death.  
This, along with the corporeal insults that might result from carrying a multiple pregnancy must 
surely provide substantiating grounds for exceptionality?  
This argument, in my view, lacks purchase. Many of the alternative forms of 
employment open to this constituency of workers are, sadly, equally, if not more invasive and 
injurious to health. Large numbers of young women who work for less than two US dollars a 
day in tanneries on the outskirts of Kolkata and Mumbai are routinely exposed to highly toxic 
chemicals such as chromium sulfate, formaldehyde, azocolorants and pentachlorophenol that 
8 
 
induce terrible skin conditions and respiratory diseases and dramatically increase their rates of 
cancer. Other mothers and children who survive by recycling batteries and e-waste in their 
homes suffer similar levels of extreme toxic exposure. In these cases, unlike those associated 
with assisted reproduction, exposure to harm is rarely limited temporally. These individuals 
are subject to corporeal insults that accumulate over decades rather than months, inevitably 
magnifying their health impacts. This is not to disavow the fact that wrongful harms may result 
from malpractice or a lack of enforcement of appropriate conditions of work for surrogates or 
egg donors, but rather to draw attention to the fact that whilst these are lamentable, they remain 
as amenable to remedy (or not) as any inadequate working conditions are, for any person, in 
any under-regulated sector of the Indian economy.  
 A second set of arguments suggest that maternal labour (the gestation and birthing of 
a child and its immediate post-partum care) is a sacred act, a form of profoundly affective 
labour that is sullied by commodification. Affective labour, the largely invisible yet intense 
work of producing and managing emotions in and between others (nurturing, comforting, 
listening, caring, protecting) has historically been understood as a highly feminized and usually 
unrecompensed labour. However, in a post-Fordist world in which industrial production has 
been largely displaced by a service economy, the commodification of all manner of care work 
has, I would argue, become entirely normalised. As Hardt and Negri put it “the production of 
‘common forms of wealth’ such as information, affects and social relationships are now 
routinely expropriated by capital to generate surplus value” (2011, p. 139).  
The work of the economic sociologist Viviana Zelizer is particularly useful here in explicating 
the complex relationships that exist between money and forms of intimate or affective labour. 
As she has noted, many commentators and scholars like to foster the notion that intimate 
relations and economic activity occupy distinct domains, the former “a sphere of sentiment and 
solidarity”, the latter “a sphere of calculation and efficiency” (2005, pp. 20-21).  We are invited 
to imagine that each remains hermetically sealed from the other and that contact between the 
two will result in ‘moral contamination’. This doctrine particularly animates the concerns that 
attend the commercialisation of reproductive labour and the potential this is thought to have in 
corrupting the sacredness of the act of child-bearing. The fear that money will debase the 
sanctity of this uniquely intimate bond is palpable.  
And yet, an unflinching inspection of our own social practices reveals that many in the 
West have no compunction whatever about commodifying all manner of commensurable, 
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intensely intimate forms of labour. We now routinely pay others to perform highly intimate 
personal care work for our elderly kin with dementia, and think nothing of asking nursery 
workers to provide long term substitute parenting to children, and indeed babies, of only a few 
months or even weeks or of age. The fact that it proves so difficult to find online images of the 
most profoundly affective examples of this kind of labour: comforting sobbing children or 
trying to read the desires of the profoundly disabled is perhaps a testament to our unwillingness 
to acknowledge how readily we delegate such intimate work to pay others whilst 
simultaneously concealing that fact. Any assertion that the affective labour performed by the 
surrogate in bearing, or caring for, the commissioned child is substantively distinct from these 
would have to be predicated on an argument that is much more consistently applied than it is 
now.  
What becomes evident is that economic relations are not only present in these realms 
but are vital actuators of this key relational work. Intimacy and economic transactions are not 
‘strange bedfellows’ but rather are brought into productive engagement everyday as we 
construct the means to fulfil our domestic and professional needs. Only once we accept that 
caring labour has always been commodified can we understand, as Zelizer (2005, p. 307) puts 
it “that some negotiated matches involve injustice, cruelty, damage, or confusion, not because 
they mix economic activity with personal relations, but because they result from improper 
exercises of power” (emphasis added). The question to concentrate on here, as she concludes, 
is thus: “which arrangements for personal care of children, the elderly, the disabled or the sick 
damage the recipients, the caregivers and the households involved … and which arrangements 
actually enrich participants’ lives” (2005, p.306). This is a matter to which I shall return shortly.   
A further commonly made assertion is that reproductive labour should be considered 
exceptional because it is uniquely ‘generative’ in nature. This is an argument with which I have 
more sympathy, yet it too bears closer analysis. Reproductive labour is said to be exceptional 
as it involves giving life to something unique (the child) that the surrogate is then asked to 
relinquish. To do so requires a certain partitioning of sentiment from action. It is undoubtedly 
true that many women would find this impossibly difficult to do. Others however, can come to 
an accommodation with relinquishment.4 This may seem unlikely or surprising to some, 
                                                          
4 It is extremely interesting to note that almost all of the reports that offer negative accounts of the surrogate 
experience purport to focus on the pain of relinquishment for some, but not all surrogates. I would strongly argue 
however, that it is not relinquishment per se that invokes such distress but rather the fact that the surrogate is 
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although it remains the case. Some may have less maternal instinct, others, conversely, view 
the commissioned child as an endowment or legacy that they are content, if not proud, to 
bequeath to others.  
There are clear commonalities and resonances here with the experiences of those who 
work in the inventive economies of the modern university, computer lab, architectural office 
or engineering facility. We too also receive remuneration (hopefully, if we put the gender pay 
gap aside, of an appropriate amount) to employ our corporealities, our bodies and brains, to 
generate unique ideas, outputs and manufactures. These are also surrendered to others who are 
encouraged to adopt and develop them on their own terms. Perhaps what all of us (surrogates 
included) are generating are what my associates in intellectual property law would call ‘creative 
works’. Books, software, or inventions, appear inanimate but, as they are released into the 
world, also come to take on a life of their own, to acquire their own ‘careers’ as the 
anthropologist Arjun Appadurai (1988) would say. Like surrogates, we retain, as their authors, 
a keen interest in their respective life courses, knowing even so, that their trajectories will be 
ones that even we will have limited powers to shape.  
 
Surrogacy: exploitative for whom?  
If then, there proves to be more commensurabilities between the work of gestating children and 
other forms of bodily, affective or generative labour than we first might have imagined, it must 
then be the conditions under which this reproductive labour is performed that serve to make it 
so exceptionally exploitative, such an affront to moral dignity. Let’s turn now to consider this 
thesis. The recent ban on the offering of commercial surrogacy services in India today is 
predicated on the argument that the practice is highly exploitative of the women involved – in 
fact, we must presume, uniquely exploitative, since it is this practice alone amongst various 
kinds of clinical labour (including, for example, participation in clinical trials) that has been 
criminalised and singled out for prohibition. We must then begin by asking the questions, ‘what 
is exploitation, and exploitative for, or by whom’?  
                                                          
refused access to any further information about the fate of their child; their ongoing health and welfare; lived 
experiences, etc. The politics of black-boxing the surrogate’s relation to the child is taken up in a following section.  
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The agreed dictionary definition of exploitation is “the action or fact of treating 
someone unfairly in order to benefit from their work”. Almost all of the most vocal 
interlocutors in the ‘reproductive labour in emerging economies is inherently exploitative’ 
debate would fashion themselves as concerned liberals who take the view that the imbalances 
that exist in the purchasing and earning power of the surrogate or egg donor and the 
commissioning parents (who are assumed to be wealthy foreigners) invokes a classic dynamic 
of exploitation in which the economic desperation of the surrogate leads them to downplay or 
discount risks to their health or psychological well-being that would otherwise deter them from 
engaging in such practices (Deveaux &Panitch, 2017; Phillips, 2017).  
‘Informed consent’ even if secured, is presumed to be invalidated when obtained under 
conditions of structural violence or injustice. Whilst, in theory, we might concur with these 
normative principles; in practice, their application becomes much more complex. I believe that 
it is only by situating these practices within the lived experiences of these women, by 
sensitively contextualising their motivations for undertaking such work within their own life 
worlds that we can arrive at a more nuanced reading of whether such work is either morally 
and ethically exploitative. In bringing these women’s voices back in to the debate we can, as it 
were, ‘flip the classroom’ by asking of ourselves that vital anthropological question: what work 
does framing commercial surrogacy or egg donation as exceptionally exploitative perform … 
and for whom?  
So let’s begin with the women: who are they? Why do they undertake this work and 
more importantly, for whom? In answering these questions, I draw on four years of fieldwork 
in Mumbai, Jaipur, Delhi and Bangalore and interviews with 123 individuals working in the 
assisted reproduction economy there, including many surrogates, sperm and egg donors, 
clinicians and commissioning parents. So, are these women, as Waldby, Cooper and others 
have argued: an underclass that exist at the margins, oppressed, exploited financially, in 
unstable outsourced employment? The answer seems to be consequential on the question of 
where one locates ‘the core’. These clinical labourers certainly don’t enjoy the financial 
security, economic and social advantages of (some) women in the metropolitan West and it is 
certainly true that surrogates and egg donors have historically been drawn from the lower castes 
and classes of India, although, and this is an important point, not the lowest classes. Ironically 
the very precarity of that cohort’s existence, the impermanence and shabbiness of their 
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accommodation, vulnerability to malnutrition and disease usually serves to exclude them from 
such employment.  
Surrogates are much more likely to have been recently employed in other related sectors 
of the service economy in work that involves the provision of closely allied forms of affective 
or bodily labour such as live-in domestic service, aged or child care work; employments in 
which many have been subjected to extreme financial or sexual exploitation or coercion. Others 
labour producing piece work at home or in garment factories, where, as Rudrappa’s research 
reveals, they endure a litany of assaults to their physical and psychological well-being, ranging 
from respiratory difficulties to urinary tract infections, from hearing loss to the stress induced 
by 14 hour shifts and sequestration in hostel style dormitories (2012, 2014). Their subjugation 
to these highly oppressive working conditions results in what we routinely acknowledge (if not 
accept) to be the mundane exploitation of the lower classes.  Mundane is a useful term here as 
it derivation from the Latin mundanus or ‘belonging to the world’ rightfully locates such 
conditions as universally present in all domains of the global capitalist economy. Whilst far 
from a cause for celebration neither does this serve to make commercial surrogacy uniquely 
exploitative nor worthy of the highly stylised disapprobation that these other, significantly 
more damaging forms of labour, rarely attract. For the women we interviewed surrogacy 
provided a rational and carefully considered means to escape these exceptionally dangerous or 
onerous employments for what they consider to be a much more secure, economically 
productive and personally rewarding form of work.  
Moral philosophers such as Wertheimer (1999) and Sample (2003) concur that 
exploitative transactions arise when the compensation or market rate for services offered to 
providers is so low that it fails to improve their situation sufficiently, whilst the exploiter profits 
unduly from the exchange. Such assessments are, however, extremely difficult to undertake 
through appeal to a set of abstract normative principles – context here, again, plays a key role 
in determining what is, and is not, a just or sufficient form of compensation. Our own research 
has determined that many women find the payment that they receive to undertake surrogacy 
(4-5,000 pounds or the equivalent of more than five years of income in their previous 
occupations) to be more than ‘sufficient’ to transform their own lives and to have considerable 
intergenerational benefits for family members, particularly their female children. In fact some 
reported that clinicians had advised them to invest the money they receive and even directly 
assisted them in purchasing property.  
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Madam bought this house herself for me. She told me that the money that you 
get you should not spend it away, buy a house, and live there, and in this way 
you can save the rent money also. So I now have a nice house, and my 
children are also happy. My daughter is also doing well and she is educated 
and acting in films. My elder son is studying and my younger son is also 
studying. Both are studying well and my life is good.  
Clearly, the purchase of education, housing, healthcare or business infrastructure can have life 
enhancing effects, the positive impacts of which cannot be readily disavowed or discounted. 
Of course the capacity to fully realise such benefits is unevenly distributed. As other studies 
have shown some surrogates are less adept at financial management and have not used the 
payments to effect lasting change in their material circumstances. Nevertheless, it is easy to 
overlook or downplay the profound and lasting alterations in the personal and political 
dynamics of their lives that result from receiving a payment of this magnitude. It is almost, 
without exception, the first time that such women have bought into their households’ income 
that substantially outperforms that of their male partners or relatives, having done so, notably, 
through the performance of a form of labour that those male figures can never emulate. The 
enhancements to their agency and autonomy (as reflected in the household’s acquiescence to 
their continued work in the field as either surrogate or agent) that can arise as a consequence 
are transformative, both domestically and culturally. In these terms the affective changes may 
prove to be more significant than the material ones.  
Would the sum that they receive for undertaking a surrogacy be deemed ‘sufficient’ if 
they were performing the same labour in, say, London? Clearly not, but that would be a 
consequence of wider structural divergences in both earning power and living costs. Similar 
discrepancies attend all forms of waged labour performed within, and between, the world’s 
more or less advanced economies. To argue that surrogacy is exploitative simply because 
surrogates are paid only £4,000  in Mumbai, but £15,000  in Newcastle, is both naïve and 
fallacious. It is, however, pertinent to question whether it is exploitative for the wealthy to take 
unfair advantage of these structural discrepancies in securing a service (surrogacy) for which 
they would elsewhere pay considerably more. That argument would certainly sustain if an 
equivalent service could be readily accessed in the purchasers’ immediate locality with 
increased cost the only deterrent to uptake. This is, strangely, not the case. Decisions by 
regulatory agencies (such as the UK’s HFEA) to abdicate responsibility for regulating 
surrogacy in practice, have facilitated the emergence, in the United Kingdom, of a precariat of 
fully unprotected surrogate workers and a flourishing shadow economy rife with deceptive 
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practices. Such developments have, ironically, served to drive many commissioning parents to 
what they perceive to be the relative safety of more highly regulated clinics located in Mumbai 
or Delhi’s most prestigious hospitals.  
This takes us then to a consideration of the terms and conditions of employment of the 
Indian surrogates who work in, or for, these clinics; the contractualisation of their labour and 
the degree to which their consent can be considered to be truly informed. Here we find another 
complex set of dynamics in play. Much has been made of the fact that Indian surrogates are 
largely unaware of the terms and conditions of their employment. Our research suggests that 
that is true in terms of their awareness of the medical risks and potential for complications but 
less so apropos the agreed financial rewards. Payment was a clear motivational factor amongst 
the surrogates we interviewed, and they, their immediate families and agents were proactive in 
securing these payments. It was clear, however, that many surrogate women had only limited 
understanding of what they would be subjected to corporeally and certainly lacked any 
authority to determine ‘treatment’ pathways.  Most are  poorly informed about the 
pharmaceutical regime they will be required to undertake; the risks of ovarian 
hyperstimulation; the number and destinations of their harvested eggs; the number of embryos 
that will be implanted in them and the consequent risk that they may be subjected to a foetal 
reduction.  
These are undoubtedly very serious matters and they could constitute exploitative 
practice. But are they necessarily or inherently exploitative? I would argue not. The work of 
framing these practices as such is only achieved by conflating arguments about what is ethically 
insupportable with that which is morally objectionable. It is clear, for example that these 
troubling examples of poor care simply constitute forms of medical malpractice that are 
ethically unacceptable but which remain amenable to remedy through regulation. The fact that 
they exist in some contexts in India simply reflects the uneven landscape of care that 
characterises the provision of assisted reproduction worldwide. We know, for example, that in 
many other economies and jurisdictions such as the Untied Kingdom, Canada, Australia and 
the United States, practitioners have established protocols to optimise patient welfare when 
undergoing procedures such as ovarian stimulation; embryo transfer; foetal reduction, egg 
donation and the like (Thompson, 2007). Why can these not be instituted as global norms of 
clinical best practice in the ART sector to level up standards of care and address uneven 
geographies of regulation? Exploitation here arises largely as a consequence of avertable 
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failings in the regulatory environment rather than being an artefact of something that is 
inherently morally abject in the practice of surrogacy itself. In other words, it is in the 
mechanics of the practice, not in the principle itself that the trouble lies.   
 
Moral economies of distributed kinship  
In addressing this point let us then lastly move from an examination of the social, political and 
economic circumstances of this form of reproduction to an analysis of the moral economy of 
surrogacy and egg donation. The argument that commercial surrogacy is morally abject, despite 
any of the terms and conditions of its practice, hinges, I believe, on  two presumptions: (a) that 
it is simply wrong to bear a child for another for payment, or (b) that commissioning is driven 
by economic privilege and expediency. Much has been written about the purported 
commodification of the child with which I have little patience. Let us consider this bold 
assertion: that those of us who have them have all ‘paid’ to acquire our children in one way or 
another, be that through the provision of courtship gifts, meals and entertainments, engagement 
rings, expensive weddings, salary support and the like. All of these transactions constitute a 
means of inducing or cross subsidising the production of children. A more unabashed approach 
to paying for such labour might jar but is it really all that distinct from the commodification of 
all manner of intimate exchanges, a practice in which we all routinely engage but systematically 
elide? 
 Is the commissioning of surrogacy driven by economic privilege and expediency? The 
assertion here is that reproductive labour is, like other forms of corporeal or affective labour 
(such as child care or domestic work) something that commissioning parents could probably 
do for themselves but don’t, as they lack either the time or the inclination; displacing that labour 
inappropriately to others by virtue only of their ability to pay to do so. What is termed ‘social 
surrogacy’ or sometimes ‘vanity’ or ‘designer’ surrogacy is said to arise when women 
(stereotypically portrayed as highly paid barristers or Bollywood stars) who are capable of 
bearing their own children expatriate this labour to others in the interests of protecting their 
career trajectories or bodily integrity. Whilst this has become a popular leitmotif for the tabloid 
press we saw no evidence of it in practice during our fieldwork. In all of the cases we saw, 
commissioning parents were seeking surrogates not because they were too lazy to have a child 
of their own but because they were experiencing specific forms of untreatable structural 
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infertility (uterine abnormalities, for example).  Whilst some celebrities have availed 
themselves of the use of surrogates, closer analysis reveals that they also often do so as they 
are infertile, or in the case of homosexuals, unable to reproduce biologically related children 
without such assistance.  
Very interestingly, many of the commissioning parents we interviewed were not 
foreigners but rather India’s rising middle classes for whom surrogacy is becoming 
increasingly normalised. Moreover, despite attempts to demonise this form of labour it is 
becoming clear that its desirability as a form so employment is rising not falling.  As one of 
the surrogates we interviewed lamented, many of those from lower castes are now having to 
compete for such work with those of higher social standing.   
When I had done it at that time there was nothing, there were very few who would be 
doing it. But now all are doing it even the rich people are doing it. People from good 
families are also doing it. At first it was that people who are poor and do not have 
anything those would do it, but now people those who have everything do it.   
How and in what ways do these developments complicate existing accounts that position 
surrogates as a class of subaltern reproductive workers labouring to realise the desires of white, 
privileged parents who commission their work from the metropolitan centres of the West?  
It is clear that regardless of whether they are located in India or the West, the vast 
majority of individuals who are commissioning surrogates are doing so as they are biologically 
incapable of reproducing their own children. It is often asserted that those who are infertile but 
wish to start families should instead adopt children. This is a line of argument with which I 
personally concur, in part, as such practices actively subvert the now canonical valorisation of 
the genetic child. As the parent of two children to whom I have no biological relation I welcome 
the disruption of such overbearing norms. However, as much as I might wish it were not so, 
the desirability of the biologically related child remains a potent trope, one that is increasingly 
driving adoption - sadly not of children - but of assisted reproductive technologies. Indeed it is 
this dynamic that compels women and men to pay the very substantial costs of infertility 
treatment (including the cost of supplied gametes) to produce a child to whom they remain at 
least partially genetically or biologically related. If the work of a ban on surrogacy is to end the 
purported indignity of paying others to sell their reproductive capacity then surely that principle 
(and the associated ban) should be applied both commensurately and universally. This would 
result in the prohibition of all compensated exchanges of gametes for the purposes of assisted 
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reproduction. I wonder how every parent of a donor assisted IVF baby would respond to that 
prospect?  
Finally, and perhaps most importantly of all, what of the surrogates’ motivations? To 
assert that such women are routinely exploited is also to presume that they exercise no agency 
in the decision making. To bear a child for another is no small undertaking. Whilst securing a 
substantial payment is a key inducement, it alone cannot be the only motivating factor. That is 
far too simplistic and unnuanced a reading. As Rudrappa notes, and as our own findings 
confirm, whilst many young women are invited or encouraged to become surrogates, most 
decline the offer, despite experiencing economic hardship. Clinics are, nevertheless, 
oversubscribed with potential applicants. As one clinical director explained to me, they turn 
down fourteen applicants for every one they accept. Clinics have neither the need nor the desire 
to accept women for whom this would be a psychologically untenable journey. In this respect 
the surrogates are what I would describe as a ‘self-selecting’ cohort. They are typically those 
women (relatively small in number) who believe they can come to a physical and psychic 
accommodation with this form of labour.   
The question of why they elect to undertake this work is central to analyses of the 
exploitation thesis. Such women often agree to become surrogates (in both India and the West) 
as they derive more personal meaning from this employment than they do from other, more 
oppressive, menial or generally inconsequential forms of work. Indeed some women I would 
argue are motivated to perform this work as they view it as a form of philanthropic labour. For 
whilst commissioning parents may be well off financially, when it comes to fecundity they are 
most definitely ‘resource poor’. Surrogates are women who must already have borne at least 
one, if not two, children of their own. Many have personally witnessed the social cost of 
infertility and the profound misery and social stigma experienced by those who are unable to 
produce a biological child.  None would argue, as Ashenden (2013, p.199) puts it, that “the 
product of a pregnancy can be easily alienated without remainder” however, are able to 
rationalise it in this context, as an act of benefaction.  As Bharti, a former surrogate and now 
agent5 explains:  
                                                          
5 Agents are individuals (often but not always former surrogates) who recruit potential surrogates, represent their 
interests in negotiations on terms and conditions and who also steward them through process of attending clinical 
appointments etc. They typically receive a commission from the clinic for undertaking this work. The Indian 
Council of Medical Research guidelines (2005) suggest that this work should be illegal however clinics thoroughly 
rely on the services of agents as they cannot by law recruit surrogates directly themselves.  
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The mother-feeling is felt in every [surrogate] woman; but it is a happy feeling 
that you are giving a child to someone who does not have her own child. An 
infertile woman suffers a lot of agony and pain. To give her a child is a very 
noble thing. 
One of the powerful implications of perpetuating racialised and gendered accounts of surrogacy 
that characterise the practitioners (the surrogates) as an oppressed and exploited minority is 
that they actively prohibit such women from occupying the role of benefactor of reproductive 
labour to the more privileged Indian or white western women and men who avail themselves 
of their services. Keeping them in this role, whilst simultaneously denying the significance of 
their labour, works to strip them further of both power and self-respect.   
How then could we more productively re-conceptualise the relations implicit in 
commercial surrogacy in India today? Ruth Sample argues (2003, p.7) that we exploit others 
when we “make use of their genuine need for the sake of advantage in ways that fail to respect 
them”.  In my view, it is when individuals (be they clinicians, commissioning parents or family 
members) actively collude to deliberately obscure or efface the vital work that the surrogate 
performs in realising these important new forms of family building that genuine exploitation 
occurs. All too frequently the role of the surrogate and certainly the egg donor is completely 
‘black boxed’. The argument that foregrounding her role will disrupt the dynamics of nuclear 
family formation are, I think both misplaced and dangerous. In fact, most of the psychosocial 
damage that arises from the practice of surrogacy - for commissioning parents, surrogates and 
surrogate children – arises, I would argue, from suppressing or denying the complex, entangled 
nature of the conception.   
Assisted reproduction must, by its very nature, usher in new kinds of families, the very 
existence of which rely on, and generate, what I would call forms of ‘distributed kinship’. 
Rather than seeking to disavow these we must collectively learn to embrace them in ways that 
promote transparency and equity for all participants. In contemplating how we might more 
effectively undertake this work we can profitably invoke some of the idioms and practices of 
intellectual property rights law. The fiction that the children of such conceptions are the 
inventions, of a single romantic partnership must be put to the sword – as Rosemary Coombe 
(1995) suggests new ‘authorial cartographies’ must be brought into play. I would argue that 
these children enter the world as what we might think of as, ‘collaboratively authored works’ 
to whom all contributors should be accorded some degree of ‘open access’. Seeking to deny or 
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obscure the investments that surrogates and egg donors make to the creation of the child is a 
form of exceptionalism that cannot be justly sustained.  
 
Conclusion  
Much interest has been concentrated on surrogacy as a form of exceptionally exploitative 
reproductive labour that ought, by some accounts, to be banned outright. However, I hope as I 
have shown here, the realities of lived experience that exist beyond the hyperbole of tabloid 
representations and their anxious protestations, work to complicate such assertions. Laissez 
faire approaches to regulation that some argue typify neoliberal modes of economic 
organisation (but which I say are a common feature of all capitalist enterprises) generate forms 
of labour exploitation to be sure, but these are not, I argue, exceptional to clinical or 
reproductive labour practices. The argument for singling surrogacy out as activity that demands 
exceptional forms of regulation (such as prohibition) is not, in my view, yet successfully 
sustained by appeal to empirical evidence.   
Must commercial surrogacy always be exploitative of an underclass of women? As 
other studies have shown and as our own also confirms, many of these women make deliberate 
and considered decisions to participate. Some do so under conditions of structural violence that 
constrain their life and employment choices, but these are amenable to reform through the 
implementation of strategies that will enhance rather than diminish the personal and political 
agency of such women. Those who seek to remove this form of employment must face the 
realities, as well as accept the moral and political responsibility for the alternatives that these 
women will be forced to accept. For many this will involve labour in even more poorly 
regulated forms of work all of which are less economically rewarding and potentially even 
more precarious and hazardous than surrogacy.  In fact we know that surrogate workers 
themselves have been protesting actively against the proposed ban on commercial surrogacy 
in India since it was announced, on the basis that they will be stripped of one of the most 
lucrative revenue generating opportunities they have, or will ever, encounter in their lifetimes.6 
For these women, bans just invoke another form of ‘ethical paternalism’.    
                                                          
6 See for example: https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jan/03/india-surrogate-embryo-ban-hardship-
gujarat-fertility-clinic 
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Where does this leave us then in terms of regulation? Options certainly exist to improve 
clinical practices within such clinics. Women have successfully lobbied in some countries for 
regulation of sex work as labour, and secured rights not only to sufficient wages but also 
medical care, occupational health and safety, work security and rights to set limits on the 
demands made by clients (Kempadoo & Doezema, 1998; Kotiswaran, 2008; Moukalif, 2009). 
Aligning surrogacy as a commensurate form of labour could provide the leverage to sustain 
similar regularisation of this form of embodied labour. In some of the larger ART clinics in 
India these rights are already being secured. The women who undergo surrogacy there have 
already exercised their autonomy and their agency in arriving at a considered and informed 
judgement that their conditions of work, remuneration, and care will be much better in the 
surrogacy clinic/workplace than they would be working in any of the other desperately menial 
and exploitative agricultural or industrial jobs that are their only other alternative forms of 
employment.  
Constructing commercial surrogacy as an abject highly exploitative practice is in my 
view, immensely problematic and lumping it together uncritically with other equally poorly 
conceptualised practices such as ‘trafficking’ and ‘slavery’ does more harm than good. 
Certainly, the notion that a ban on commercial surrogacy will extinguish the practice is fanciful 
to say the least. Addressing the inequities in practice that we see in different corners of the 
globe requires thoughtfully constructed, nuanced and most importantly grounded regulation 
not bumptious self-congratulatory bans that will only serve to worsen experiences and 
outcomes for those already undertaking this work.  And after all, what could such a ban possibly 
achieve? India is now part of a highly interconnected and interdependent globalised fertility 
industry. If the tide of surrogacy goes out in India it will only wash up somewhere else, 
displacing the inequities that exist in one country onto unsuspecting others in alternative 
locations: Mexico, Cambodia, Nepal to name but a few.   
Within and amongst all this, it is the surrogate, as Ashenden (2013, p.212) astutely 
notes, “who is made to bear the burden of responsibility for society’s ambivalence towards new 
reproductive practices”. Imagining into existence new ways of acknowledging the value of her 
work whilst simultaneously enhancing her legal and social protections remains a key objective, 
one that will require the application of supple conceptualisations of the moral and ethical 
dynamics at work in such practices rather than a retreat into the safe harbour of 
‘exceptionalism’.  
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